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Abstract This paper presents a computational cognitive
model for action awareness focusing on action preparation
and performance by considering its cognitive effects and
affects from both prior and retrospective form relative to
the action execution. How action selection and execution
contribute to the awareness or vice versa is a research
question, and from the findings of brain imaging and
recording techniques more information has become avail-
able on this. Some evidence leads to a hypothesis that
awareness of action selection is not directly causing the
action execution (or behaviour) but comes afterwards as an
effect of unconscious processes of action preparation. In
contrast, another hypothesis claims that both predictive and
inferential processes related to the action preparation and
execution may contribute to the conscious awareness of the
action, and furthermore, this awareness of an action is a
dynamic combination of both prior awareness (through
predictive motor control processes) and retrospective
awareness (through inferential sense-making processes)
relative to the action execution. The proposed model in-
tegrates the findings of both conscious and unconscious
explanations for both action awareness and ownership and
acts as a generic computational cognitive model to explain
agent behaviour through the interplay between conscious
and unconscious processes. Validation of the proposed
model is achieved through simulations on suitable scenar-
ios which are covered with actions that are prepared
without being conscious at any point in time, and also with
the actions that agent develops prior awareness and/or
retrospective awareness. Having selected an interrelated set
of scenarios, a systematic approach is used to find a suit-
able but generic parameter value set which is used
throughout all the simulations that highlights the strength
of the design of this cognitive model.
Keywords Awareness  Prior  Retrospective  Cognitive
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1 Introduction
Humans intuitively feel that their behaviour is an effect of
their conscious decisions for certain actions aiming for
desired outcomes [1]. However, what exactly is con-
sciousness is a well-known question among many scientists
in many disciplines (see [2, 3]); for example, is it just a
process in the brain, and if so, how is it composed? With
the developments in brain imaging and recording tech-
niques, more and more detailed information on various
brain processes becomes available, including the conscious
awareness of actions. One of the leading hypotheses for
action awareness is that humans may prepare for and per-
form actions without being conscious of these preparation
and execution processes. More specifically, the feeling of
intention for an action is not causing the behaviour but
comes after the action preparation and just before the ac-
tion execution time [4–8]. It has been found that for certain
types of actions, the decision to perform it is already made
at least hundreds of milliseconds (and even up to 10 s)
before any awareness state occurs [4, 5, 8]. The brain
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predicts the outcome of a decision even before the decision
reaches awareness and humans’ (illusionary) consciousness
seems like an after-effect of a set of unconscious cognitive
processes leading to the action [1, 4–8].
The human brain is a complex, intricate, adaptive, dy-
namic system; it is difficult to unravel it and comprehend
its mechanisms (cf. [9–14]). Therefore, given the com-
plexity and contradictions observed in different ex-
periments, alternative hypotheses are also proposed on
action awareness (cf. [15–19]). In particular, it is interest-
ing to analyse how an individual is acquiring skills related
with a task that he/she is not familiar before (i.e. before
something is becoming a habitual task) and how awareness
contributes in such a situation [2]. For example, someone
who is in the mid age but has no prior experience of cy-
cling, it is an interesting phenomenon to find the experi-
ences gone through in the learning process to develop this
skill. Most probably at the beginning of this task, it may be
really challenging and much attention and awareness are
required to perform the task. As a result of that he/she may
not be able to change the (visual) focus at all to other
environmental cues in order to maintain the balance, keep
the ride straight, take turns safely, and pedal up a sloop.
Most probably combining what is predicted and what is
observed, thereby minimising the error (prediction vs. ac-
tual) is the basis for the collected experience in the learning
period. Furthermore, how the awareness affects the neural
plasticity is an interesting phenomenon too. Although in
the learning period, a high level of awareness on the action
is important, once it becomes a habitual task such aware-
ness may practically become absent: most probably he/she
may not pay any attention at all on pedalling, balancing and
keeping straight. Therefore, in daily life experiences pre-
dictive and inferential processes for action awareness are
important. Nevertheless, when a person learned how to ride
a bicycle properly, still he/she may not able to have a small
snack or holding an umbrella in a rainy time while cycling
(though these can also become habitual tasks for some
people). Therefore, just slightly deviating from a habitual
task seems to require awareness or new experience.
Moore and Haggard [20] have investigated how pre-
dictive or inferential processes of action execution play a
role in conscious awareness of an action. They have pro-
posed that awareness of an action is a dynamic combina-
tion of both prior awareness (i.e. awareness of the action
prediction) and retrospective awareness (i.e. the awareness
of the effects of an action), through predictive motor
control and inferential sense-making relative to the action
execution, respectively (cf. [20, 21]). When a prior
awareness state occurs, he/she may become aware of going
to perform the action. Having such a prior awareness state
still may leave open whether the agent is able to con-
sciously decide to perform or not to perform the action (cf.
[1, 4–8]). For example, is still some form of vetoing of the
action possible? In principle, the awareness state may play
the role of generating a kind of green light for execution of
the action. However, equally well the prior awareness state
may just play the role of a warning for the agent to be
prepared that the action will happen (anyway). As stated in
[5, 8] it has been found that for certain types of actions, the
decision to perform it is already made at least hundreds of
milliseconds (and even up to 10 s) before any awareness
state occurs. These findings may suggest that prior
awareness often will have no effect on the decision. But
this may strongly depend on the type of action. For ex-
ample, it will be difficult to believe that the action of
buying a car or a house remains unconscious and may not
be amendable to vetoing based on awareness states (the
Monty Hall Problem is also another good situation for this
concern). An awareness state can also develop in retro-
spect, after the action was performed and this will answer
the question: ‘what have I done?’. Such a retrospective
awareness state often relates to acknowledging others from
and taking responsibility for having performed the action.
It may also play an important role in learning as mentioned
in the previous example (i.e. by evaluating the obtained
effect in a conscious manner leads to improvement of the
performance of the action selection).
This paper extends the work published in [22] by re-
fining the neurologically inspired agent model with more
realistic simulation results, new scenarios and a detailed
formal specification of the model, together with a more
sophisticated parameter estimation methodology. The se-
lected scenarios include a reasonable spectrum of situations
in which (a) actions are prepared without being conscious
at any point in time, (b) the agent develops prior awareness
or retrospective awareness or both. An example of a schi-
zophrenic patient and of a patent in an early stage that may
lead to a depression situation are also included. As research
questions, this paper mainly contributes to
(1) How does the internal prediction process shape or
contribute to the (prior) awareness of the action?
(2) How does the inferential sense-making shape or
contribute to the (retrospective) awareness of the
action execution?
(3) How does the awareness contribute to action
execution?
(4) What is the relation and interplay between conscious
and unconscious action formation through action
ownership and relevant awareness states?
In addition to awareness states, ownership states for an
action are also considered in this paper. They are mainly
used as important states in the unconscious action forma-
tion process. The specific role of the ownership states (in
prior and retrospective form) has been separately discussed
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in [23]; such a more detailed overview is not included in
this paper. The structure of the paper organised with a
conceptual basis that includes evidences from cognitive
neuroscience which followed with a model description in
which a detail explanation of the model together with its
mathematical basis and formal specification will be pre-
sented. To validate the workings of the proposed model,
eight scenarios are simulated through a unique parameter
value set which was estimated using a systematic approach.
Finally, a discussion will be presented highlighting the
usefulness of a model in this nature and future works.
2 Action awareness viewed neurologically,
psychologically and behaviourally
In neurological, psychological and behavioural literature,
the notions of awareness and ownership of an action have
received much attention. Action ownership is a useful
concept which is mainly important to differentiate in how
far a person attributes an action to him or herself, or to
another person (see [23]). Although in many cases, the
feeling that you get when you perform something or an-
other person is performing the same action may be similar,
it is clearly possible to identify whether the action belongs
to you or to someone else. More importantly, the infor-
mation about another person’s behaviour influences your
self evaluation and vice versa, which makes humans social
beings (cf. [24, 25]). After the discovery of mirror neurons,
such social phenomena including empathy, imitation, and
coordination in a social context can be explained more
scientifically as a cognitive process [26–28]. Mirror neu-
rons have been mainly identified in two cortical areas: the
posterior part of the inferior frontal cortex and the anterior
part of the inferior parietal lobule [28]. They have shown
strong correlations not only with specific movements, but
also with specific goals (or goal directed actions: e.g.
reaching for and grasping an object). From the develop-
ment perspective of human cognition on self and other
representations, their interconnection and how those relate
to the cognitive processing were highlighted:
Over the first several years of life, children acquire
knowledge of both objective and subjective aspects of
self and others. By 18–24 months of age infants can
recognize their own mirror image, a capacity that has
been linked to the emergence of self-conscious emo-
tions (e.g. embarrassment […]). During the pre-
school years, children simultaneously develop the
capacity to represent their own and others’ mental
states […]. This development entails the ability to
recognize when self and other perspectives and ex-
periences are shared and thus congruent, and under
which circumstances they differ from one another.
Interestingly, the development of mental state un-
derstanding is functionally related to executive
functions […], suggesting that the prefrontal cortex
is implicated in self/other cognitive representations.
Indeed, neuroimaging data suggest that theory of
mind tasks and executive function tasks share over-
lapping areas of activation in the medial prefrontal
cortex ([24], pp. 527–528)
This separation of self and other is contributing to the
ability to recognise ownership of your own action. Re-
search has shown evidence that action prediction (based
on sensory information) leads to an action execution with
ownership, while when there are problems with action
prediction that leads to abnormal states of ownership of
that action. For example, when you are tickled by
someone, as you have not predicted the action you will
experience various sensations due to this sudden action,
and the ownership of that action may not be with you
(though you do have the body ownership in this situation)
(cf. [29]). Chaminade and co-workers [25] have high-
lighted this:
The neural underpinnings of internal models for
motor control have been investigated with human
non-invasive neuroimaging techniques (for review
see [30]). Motor commands that are used by forward
models to suppress sensory signals are believed to
originate upstream from the primary motor cortex
[31], though they may also involve premotor areas in
the posterior inferior frontal gyrus [32]. Actual sen-
sory feedback is used to compute prediction errors
for model evaluation and update. When we are tick-
led by another person [33] the sensory consequences
of its actions are unpredictable, and the lack of
predictability leads to a high prediction error asso-
ciated with increased activity in the secondary so-
matosensory cortex. This area, located bilaterally in
the parietal opercula [34], plays a key role in sen-
sorimotor integration [35], and has been involved in
the assessment of action ownership ([25], p. 2, [36])
The nature of human actions varies from direct re-
sponses on stimuli to actions that take longer periods to
process and react. Here the first types of action are often
labelled as automatic or unconscious and the other types as
more conscious or intentional [37]. In contrast to action
ownership, action awareness is a conscious state. Patients
with the anarchic hand syndrome (AHS) [patients with
frontal lobe and callosal damage (cf. [38])] always have
some form of ownership and awareness of their action but
are not able to control the action [39]. For example, in a
cafe just seeing a cup of coffee of an unknown person, for
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an AHS patient might be sufficient to reach and grasp it due
to the automatic activation of action plans on this habitual
task. In normal context this has been trained as a habitual
task, but with the (prior) awareness of people who know
when he or she should do this. A few more of such AHS
examples are grabbing a doorknob or scribbling with a
pencil or combing one’s hair [38]. Furthermore, persons
suffering from schizophrenia may easily attribute self-
generated actions to (real or imaginary) other persons (see
[23]). Furthermore, it has been noted that the problem with
AHS patients is to control their action, while with a schi-
zophrenic patient it is a problem with awareness of the
action (an AHS patient tries to prevent abnormal behaviour
of the alien hand by the good hand after it executed the
action) [38]. Through learning with intention and aware-
ness, people have pre-stored actions per stimulus and later
without the intention or the awareness the brain will au-
tomatically evoke the relevant action which was habitually
associated [40]. The frequency and recency of a learned
habitual task seem to relate to its probability of getting
selected.
The research on action awareness is a challenging task
and it is assumed to be that individuals are aware only of
the tip of the action iceberg; much further research is
necessary to explore and refine the body of knowledge on
this (cf. [2, 3, 8, 11, 15, 21]). Nevertheless, there are in-
teresting research findings on this. Empirical evidence
collected through an experiment setup proposed by Ben-
jamin Libet and his colleagues [8] has challenged the tra-
ditional view of human will and has shown that the brain
initiates voluntary movements before we are aware of
having decided to move. From a cognitive neuroscience
perspective, human actions are mainly a result of signals
getting to motor neurons (motoneuron) in the spinal cord
mainly via the primary motor cortex and some of its
neighbour areas [e.g. pre motor cortex, supplementary
motor cortex (SMA)]. Early activation of the primary
motor cortex before the agent gets the conscious intention
to move (or to act) is called readiness potential and this
begins hundreds of milliseconds or even up to 10 s before
any awareness state occurs [4, 5, 8]. Therefore, it was
proposed that conscious will is an illusion and it is too slow
to initiate an action, but action formation is due to an un-
conscious causal chain of processes and just before the
action execution, we will develop the awareness of the
action (not as the cause of the action but as an effect of
unconscious processes). John-Dylan Haynes has further
improved the Libet experiment setup to advance beyond
the shortcomings of the experiment (see [5]) and with his
findings again the importance of exploring the tightness of
the link between unconscious predictive brain processes
and subsequent decisions from a conscious perspective is
highlighted:
An important point that needs to be discussed is to
what degree the finding of choice-predictive infor-
mation supports any causal relationship between
brain activity and the conscious will. Such causal
links have been demonstrated previously by direct
cortical stimulation over parietal and frontal cor-
tex.37,80 However, it is unclear if the early predictive
signals are also causally involved in the decision. As
for the criterion of temporal precedence, there should
be no doubt that our data finally demonstrate that
brain activity can predict a decision long before it
enters awareness. A different point is the criterion of
constant connection. A constant connection would
require that the decision could be predicted with
100 % accuracy from prior brain activity. Libet’s
original experiments were based on averages, so no
statistical assessment can be made about the accu-
racy with which decisions can be predicted. Our
prediction of decisions from brain activity is statis-
tically reliable, but far from perfect. The predictive
accuracy of around 60 % (which is significant, but
only 10 % above chance) can be improved if the
decoding is tailored to each subject. However, even
under optimal conditions, this is far from 100 % for
several reasons… … …. Importantly, a different in-
terpretation could be that the inaccuracy simply re-
flects the fact that the early neural processes might
only be partially predictive of the outcome of the
decision. In this view, even full knowledge of the state
of activity of populations of neurons in FPC and in
the precuneus might not permit the full prediction of
a decision. In that case, the signals have the form of a
biasing signal that influences the decision to a de-
gree, but additional influences at later time points
might still play a role in shaping the decision. The
fact that decoding after the decision from motor
cortex can be achieved with higher accuracy might
point toward the fact that neural signals in BA10 and
in PC are not fully predictive in principle. However,
the exact topology of clustering of calls with similar
tuning preferences in BA10/PC is, to date, unknown,
and thus might turn out to be less suitable for fMRI
decoding than in motor cortex ([5], pp. 16–17)
With the concerns highlighted in the above quote (for
more criticisms on this hypothesis see [41]), though the
awareness state emerges just before the action execution, it
is not yet clear whether there is not at all an impact on
action execution from this subjective awareness. One of the
issues that have turned out to play an important role both in
the execution decisions for an action, and in its attribution,
is the prediction of the (expected) effects of the action,
based on internal simulation starting from the preparation
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of the action [42, 43]. If these predicted effects are satis-
factory, this may entail a ‘go’ decision for the execution of
the action, thus exerting control over action execution. In
contrast, less satisfactory predicted effects may lead to a
‘no go’ decision (cf. [44–46]). Predicted action effects also
play an important role in attribution of the action to an
agent after it has been performed. In neurological research,
it has been found that poor predictive capabilities are a
basis for false attributions of actions, for example, for pa-
tients suffering from schizophrenia [38, 47, 48]. In addition
to the predictive effects, the sensation of the actual effect
(after executing the action) also has been noted as impor-
tant in action formation research [15, 17, 21, 37, 43]. In
literature, it has been reported that the predicted sensory
effect and the sensed actual effect are integrated with each
other as a basis for proper attribution of the action [20, 47,
48]. Another element, put forward in [20], is the distinction
between action awareness based on prediction (prior to
execution), and action awareness based on an inference
after execution of the action (in retrospect):
Our results suggest that both predictive and infer-
ential processes contribute to the conscious aware-
ness of operant action. The relative contribution of
each of these processes seems to be context depen-
dent. When we can predict the consequences of our
actions, as in a high action-effect contingency block,
the awareness of action reflects these predictions.
This would provide us with a predictive sense of our
own agency. In addition, our results show clear evi-
dence that inferential processes also influence the
conscious awareness of operant action………. The
interaction between predictive and inferential pro-
cesses is of particular interest … … …. The time
course over which information about action is built
up may be an important clue to this interaction……
…. Sensory feedback provides more precise evidence
about actions and their effects. This evidence be-
comes available only after a short sensory delay, but
can then be transferred to memory. Thus, reliable and
enduring sensory evidence replaces short-lived pre-
dictive estimates. We suggest that awareness of ac-
tion therefore switches from a predictive to an
inferential source as the action itself occurs, and as
sensory information becomes available.’0([20],
pp. 142–143)
With these evidences, they have suggested that aware-
ness of an action is a dynamic combination of both prior
awareness (i.e. awareness of the action-effect prediction)
and retrospective awareness (i.e. the awareness of the ef-
fects of an action) through predictive motor control and
inferential sense-making relative to the action execution,
respectively [15, 21, 37, 43] (cf. [19]). Furthermore,
Haggard and co-workers presented a new phenomenon
called intentional binding: when a voluntary action pro-
duces (with the awareness and intention) the temporal
(subjective) gap between the action and its perceived sen-
sory outcome is less when the awareness is pre-existing but
it is high when the awareness does not involve this [15].
This phenomenon has been argued to be an effect of either
prior awareness or retrospective awareness with different
experiment setups. To investigate the relation with prior
awareness, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) was
randomly applied over the motor cortex and the entailed
disruption of awareness observed (here through the inten-
tion in this setup). A significantly weakened intentional
binding has been observed; therefore, it may be useful to
highlight the necessity of prior awareness (see [19]).
Similarly, there are experiments to analyse the influence
from retrospective awareness selecting some tasks where
prediction of the action outcome is difficult (or unpre-
dictable) but there is a ‘tone’ after the action execution [20]
and it has been observed that retrospective processes play a
role when prior predictive processes are absent (or when
prediction was minimal). In addition to the mentioned roles
in prior and retrospective effects of intentional binding,
there are some evidences for its neural basis also:
Moore and colleagues investigated the contribution
of two specific target sites: the pre-supplementary
motor area (pre-SMA) and primary motor cortex
(M1). The pre-SMA is involved in higher-order cog-
nitive aspects of self-generated action [49] and with
the conscious experience of intending to act [50]. In
this sense it is likely to support predictive contribu-
tions to intentional binding. On the other hand, M1
processes signals that are involved in actual motor
execution, signals that the authors suggest are re-
quired to support inferences of agency … … …. It
was found that only stimulation of pre-SMA led to a
significant reduction in intentional binding. Stimula-
tion of M1 marginally reduced intentional binding,
but this effect was not significant. The authors
therefore concluded that pre-SMA is likely to play a
key role in intentional binding. ([19], pp. 5)
Inhibition and suppressive mechanisms may also be as
important as the excitation mechanisms in cognitive con-
trol [though some different viewpoints are also put forward
(see [51])]. By Gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA), neu-
rons are performing inhibition at synaptic, circuit and
systems levels (cf. [51]). Furthermore, various inhibition
types in neuroscience and psychology have been discussed
in [51]. Inhibition activates in automatic (e.g. lateral inhi-
bition: if a particular representation accumulates more
evidences, that will suppress its fellow representations) and
voluntary (e.g. suppression of an irrelevant response,
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stimulus or memory; in intentionally) manners. Another
peculiar aspect that has been observed is that within the
process of co-occurrence of predicted effects and sensed
actual effects, the predicted effect suppresses the sensed
actual effect [29, 52, 53]. Moreover, it has been put for-
ward that the predicted effect and the sensed actual effect
are not simply compared or matched, as claimed in the so-
called ‘comparator model’ in earlier literature such as [38,
42, 54], but in fact are added to each other in some inte-
gration process [20, 47, 48].
Though these evidences are facilitating an adequate
level of information to comprehend a theoretical cognitive
system in the form of a model, it is further required to
confirm these findings; this may have different variants to
be explored in future research.
3 Description of the cognitive computational model
Having discussed the evidence on awareness (a person’s
subjective experience) and ownership (in how far does a
person attribute an action to him or herself or to another
person) in Sect. 2, this section presents a computational
agent model. This model will be used in agent-driven ap-
plications where the awareness is paramount (or necessary)
for decision-making and justifications of actions through
communication. More specifically, this model can provide
interesting and important input for problem domains con-
cerning performing or learning specific healthy behaviours
or lifestyles. In such domains, having an idea about the
extent of the awareness of decisions concerning health or
lifestyle is important and the model may provide the fun-
damentals for applications in these domains (with further
refinements and customization where needed). Further-
more, this model may be useful in medical domains where
people can analyse and compare the phenomenal effects of
certain scenarios through various simulations and further to
compare and contrast different hypothesis in theoretical
manner to conduct more complex experiments. Also
computational simulations have become a promising ap-
proach to analyse the emergence in complex systems (e.g.
in the aviation domain, or in social science) and a model
like this may provide more realistic results especially when
human cognitive aspects are necessary in such simulations
(e.g. simulating situation awareness in air traffic control,
including the human cognitive aspects).
An overview of the postulated cognitive agent model is
presented in Fig. 1 and its abbreviation details can be found
in Table 1. The model is a refined version of a previous
model presented in [22] but improving the action prepa-
ration process and simulation results. In this model,
awareness states are taken specific for a given action a,
effect b, context c and stimulus s. When the context c is
self, an awareness state for a, b, c and s indicates self-
attribution awareness, whereas for context c, an observed
agent B, it indicates awareness of attribution of the action
to B. Specific attention is given to ‘self’ than ‘other’ in
simulations of this paper (for ‘other’ see [22, 23]). Fur-
thermore, causal relationships in the model are based on
the neurological literature presented in the Sect. 2; they do
not take specific neurons into consideration but use more
abstracted cognitive or mental states for the design of the
action execution






 SS(sk) SR(sk)WS(sk) 
RO(ai, bi, ck, sk) 
PAwr (ai, bi, ck, sk)
PA(ai) 
RAwr(ai, bi, ck, sk)
  PO(ai, bi, ck, sk)
EO(ai, bi, ck, sk) 
Fig. 1 Overview of the
computational cognitive agent
model. Here an arrow
represents a direct activation to
state B from state A, an arrow
represents a direct
suppression to state B from state
A, an arrow represents a
suppression to all the
complements of ‘ith’ state on Bi
from state Ai (where ‘i’ presents
an instance of a particular state),
and represents a direct
supression to all parellel forms
of that state
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model (through an interlevel relation between the neuro-
logical level and the cognitive/affective mental modelling
level). The model uses three world states (WS) as inputs
for:
stimulus s : WS sð Þ
context c : WS cð Þ
effect b : WS bð Þ
The stimulus s represents any internal (bodily, e.g. self-
generated facial expression) or external change that may
lead to an action execution. Context c represents additional
information perceived to improve the process of action
selection. The context c can be differentiated as ‘self’ and
‘other’ (self-other distinction). Effects of mirroring can be
modelled when c is ‘other’ (see [22, 23]). The effect
b represents the effects of the execution of an action a.
The input world states WS(s), WS(c) and WS(b) lead to
sensor states SS(s), SS(c) and SS(b), and subsequently to
sensory representation states SR(s), SR(c) and SR(b), re-
spectively. The unconscious causality of action formation
has been modelled as explained in [55]: by combining
Damasio’s as-if body loop (see [44–46]) and James’s body
loop (see [56]) hypotheses. The body loop has been map-
ped in this model by the following causal relationships:
WS sð Þ ! SS sð Þ ! SR sð Þ ! PA að Þ ! EA að Þ ! WS bð Þ
! SS bð Þ ! SR bð Þ ! F bð Þ
Damasio extended the body loop concept and argued
that the cognitive process of action selection is due to an
effect of an internal simulation process prior to the
execution of an action [44–46]. The brain will evaluate the
effect of each relevant action option [i.e. PA(ai)] by com-
paring the feelings associated to each individual valuated
effects (without actually executing them through the body
loop). The simulated option that has the strongest valuated
feeling performs as a GO signal through the body loop and
else are NO–GO options. The as-if body loop consists of:
sensory representation ! preparation for bodily changes
! felt emotion
In this model, this is represented by the as-if body loop
as follows:
PA að Þ ! SR bð Þ ! F bð Þ
The as-if body loop and the body loop demonstrate the
working of predicted sensory effects and sensed actual ef-
fects, respectively, as highlighted in the Sect. 2. These pro-
cesses are mainly considered to be unconscious processes
involving multiple options for responses evaluated in par-
allel, to determine an adequate response associated to a sti-
mulus (cf. [40]). Through this parallel internal action
simulation mechanism, the agent will not select a random
option but the one which has the strongest valuated feeling.
Therefore, depending on the weight values attached to each
option at that particular moment, the model will show dif-
ferent behaviours in simulations. This purely unconscious
mechanism may be interrupted by the effects of awareness
(which will be explained later) to select something different
by adding some bias to thementioned process. Being a cyclic
process, the effects of an injected bias may have the ability to
compete with other options to finally provide a GO signal.
In Fig. 1, state labels are attached with subscript letters
k and i, which indicate, for example, the kth instance for a
stimulus s (e.g. WS(sk)) for a given sk stimulus and the ith
option for an action a (e.g. PA(ai)). Therefore, through this
model, it is possible to have multiple action options either
through a single stimulus or from multiple stimuli, de-
pending on the specific model instance.
Each PA(ai) state is affected by its associated feeling
through the as-if body loop. Moreover, each PA(ai) state
suppresses its complementary options PA(aj) for j = i (as
shown in dotted looped red arrow in Fig. 1) proportional to
the accumulated strength of that option. This behaviour is
Table 1 Nomenclature for
Fig. 1
WS(W) World state W (W can be either: context ck, stimulus sk, or effect bi)
SS(W) Sensor state for W (W can be either: context ck, stimulus sk, or effect bi)
SR(W) Sensory representation of W (W can be either: context ck, stimulus sk, or effect bi)
PA(a) Preparation for action ai
F(bi) Feeling for action ai after as-if loop or action execution
EA(ai) Execution of action ai
PO(ai, bi, ck, sk) Prior ownership state for action ai with bi, ck, and sk
RO(ai, bi, ck, sk) Retrospective ownership state for ai with bi, ck, and sk
PAwr(ai, bi, ck, sk) Prior-awareness state for action ai with bi, ck, and sk
RAwr(ai, bi, ck,sk) Retrospective awareness state for action ai with bi, ck, and sk
EO(ai, bi, ck, sk) Communication of ownership and awareness of ai with bi, ck, and sk
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in line with the explanation for the lateral inhibition in [51]
and will contribute to further strengthen the action selec-
tion process. Therefore, naturally the strongest internally
satisfied option (which is exceeding a threshold value) will
become selected as a result of the unconscious action se-
lection process as explained earlier. The feeling state in this
model can be either a positive feeling or a negative feeling.
A given stimulus sk may trigger multiple preparation op-
tions in parallel and those might have different associated
feelings, also in parallel (note that when a feeling state’s
activation level is ‘0’ it is assumed to be a case of no
feeling).
Prior ownership states have been integrated with the
above-mentioned processes and mainly they get affected
from sensory representation states SR(sk) and SR(ck), ac-
tion preparation state PA(ai) and feeling states F(bi). Also
the PO(ai, bi, ck, sk) states affect prior awareness states
PAwr(ai, bi, ck, sk), retrospective ownership states RO(ai,
bi, ck, sk), action execution states EA(ai) and sensory rep-
resentation states SR(bi) of effects bi. Having a direct link
between SR(sk) and PO(ai, bi, ck, sk) facilitates the em-
bedding of salient features of the input to the ownership
and therefore the agent will be able to relate the input and
output [together with RO(ai, bi, ck, sk)]. Furthermore, the
link from SR(ck) to PO(ai, bi, ck, sk) facilitates the neces-
sary behaviour of mirror neurons when c is other (for more
details see [23]). The state PO(ai, bi, ck, sk) has a sup-
pressive effect on SR(bi); this provides the mechanism by
which the predicted effect suppresses the sensed actual
effect (see [29, 52, 53]). Similar to prior ownership, once
an action is executed retrospective ownership will develop.
The retrospective ownership state RO(ai, bi, ck, sk) is af-
fected by the prior ownership state PO(ai, bi, ck, sk), SR(ck),
F(bi) and EA(ai). Furthermore, RO(ai, bi, ck, sk) activation
has effects on the states RAwr(ai, bi, ck, sk), PO(ai, bi, ck,
sk) and EO(ai, bi, ck, sk). As RO is affected by EA(ai) and
F(bi), this provides the cognitive behaviour of retrospective
effects as differentiated from prior behaviour. For more
details on ownership states of this model, see [23]. Once
RO(ai, bi, ck, sk) developed it has a suppressive effect on
PO(ai, bi, ck, sk) and through this also it is contributing to
the cognitive shift from predictive to inferential.
For each ownership state, an associated awareness state
may (or may not) emerge. Awareness states play a higher
order cognitive role. The direct links from ownership and
feeling to awareness state realise bottom–up activation.
Conversely, the effects of awareness states on other states
realise top–down activation, which is considered to be a
conscious or intended process. Therefore in the presented
model, PAwr(ai, bi, ck, sk) is only affected by PO(ai, bi,
ck, sk) and F(bi). This is useful to model the idea of
Benjamin Libet and others: brains initiate voluntary
movements before we are aware of having decided to
move (also see the simulations in Sect. 4). Moreover
PAwr(ai, bi, ck, sk) affects PA(ai) and EA(ai) and this is
reflects the idea of Haggard and co-workers: there may be
an impact from this subjective awareness state on action
execution. By this PAwr(ai, bi, ck, sk) to PA(ai) link the
agent can inject some bias to the current unconscious
process through awareness. This may strengthen a weaker
action option and improve the predictive feeling of that
option (which may lead to getting it executed). Further-
more, in this model PAwr(ai, bi, ck, sk) can also directly
strengthen the action execution state. Both the prior
ownership states and the prior awareness states are asso-
ciated to the predictive aspects of the system. In contrast,
retrospective awareness states are associated to the in-
ferential aspects, as highlighted in Sect. 2: awareness of
an action is a dynamic combination of both prior
awareness and retrospective awareness through predictive
motor control and inferential sense-making relative to the
action execution. Once the RAwr(ai, bi, ck, sk) state is
activated, it has a suppressive effect on PAwr(ai, bi, ck, sk)
and due to this PAwr(ai, bi, ck, sk) will weaken and
RAwr(ai, bi, ck, sk) will be dominant after the action
execution. Finally, acknowledging of ownership and
awareness of an action is modelled by the connection
from the RO(ai, bi, ck, sk) and RAwr(ai, bi, ck, sk) to the
EO(ai, bi, ck, sk). Once the state EO(ai, bi, ck, sk) has
become activated, it has a suppressive effect on SR(bi) so
that this will allow to stop the inferential sense-making
process.
In addition to the above mentioned connections a few
more suppressive connections are available, which are
shown in orange arrows in Fig. 1. These connections are
mainly for purposes of having an appropriate scenario. Once
a stimulus s and context c are activated, the agent starts to
activate the internal processes as mentioned above and once
the agent performed the action, a mechanism is assumed that
stops the stimuli as an action effect: the agent has performed
the task and due to that environment has changed. Therefore
these orange connections: EA(ai) toWS(sk), EO(ai, bi, ck, sk)
to WS(ck), and EO(ai, bi, ck, sk) to WS(bi) have been in-
cluded to stop the input stimulus sk, input context ck and the
effect bi of action ai. Furthermore, having two inputs (i.e. s1,
s2, c1 and c2) if only one action is executed [let’s say i = 1:
EA(a1) and EO(a1, b1, c1, s1)] then it will be assumed that the
executed action will suppress all the inputs, for the purpose
of an appropriate scenario.
The following is a brief summary of the agent’s internal
causality when given stimulus sk and context ck as inputs:
(1) action-effect prediction sensory representation of
effect bi is affected by preparation of an action ai
(2) preparation for action ai is affected by sensory
representation of sk, prior-awareness, feeling of
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effect prediction of action ai and the complements
of current preparation for action ai
(3) a prior ownership state is triggered based on
preparation for action ai, predicted effects bi of ai,
stimulus sk, retrospective ownership and context ck
(4) a prior awareness state is activated based on
feeling of the predicted effect, prior ownership and
retrospective awareness
(5) execution of action ai is affected by prior-aware-
ness, prior ownership and preparation for action ai
(6) a prior ownership state and prior awareness state
exert control over the execution of a prepared
action (go/no–go decision, vetoing)
(7) suppression of the sensory representation of effect
bi by both prior ownership and communication of
ownership and awareness
(8) suppression of the prior ownership state when the
retrospective ownership state is developed
(9) suppression of the prior awareness state when the
retrospective awareness state is developed
(10) a retrospective ownership state is activated based
on co-occurrence of predicted action effects and
action effects sensed afterwards
(11) a retrospective awareness state is activated based
on action effects sensed by execution of action ai,
retrospective ownership and prior-awareness
(12) a retrospective ownership state and retrospective
awareness are internal states that also can lead to
acknowledging authorship of the action (indi-
vidually), for example, in a social context
(13) execution of an action ai affects the stimulus sk in
the world
(14) communication of ownership and awareness affects
both context ck in the world and effect bi of action
ai in the world
3.1 Dynamics of the model
Connections between state properties (the arrows in Fig. 1)
have weights xk, as indicated in Table 2. In this table, a
weight xk has a value between -1 and ?1 and may de-
pend on the specific context ck, stimulus sk, action ai and/or
effect bi involved. By varying these connection strengths,
different possibilities for the repertoire offered by the
model can be realised and can be aligned with the con-
sidered scenario and behaviour. Usually weights are as-
sumed to be nonnegative, except for the inhibiting or
suppressive connections. The behaviour of the model
(through simulations) depends on the values of each of
these weights (together with other parameters). Deter-
mining proper values for these parameters is a non trivial
task.
In this table, the column LP refers to the (temporally)
Local Properties: LP1 to LP17 (cf. [57]) and that specifies
the update dynamics of the activation value of the ‘to state’
based on the activation levels of the ‘from states’. For the
dynamics of each local property, a LEADSTO formalisa-
tion is used, which has been shown to be an appropriate
approach to model dynamic behaviours of computational
cognitive models [57]. LEADSTO is a hybrid modelling
language in which a dynamic property or temporal causal
relation a ? b denotes that when a state property a (or
conjunction thereof) occurs, then after a certain time delay,
state property b will occur (see [57] for the relevance and
benefits of LEADSTO in dynamic models). LEADSTO can
be compared to Linear Temporal Logic, but differs in the
sense that predicate logical state expressions can be used
and also real numbers in them. The traces generated for
LEADSTO can be seen as continuous time models satis-
fying the finite variability property: between any two time
points there are only a finite number of state changes.
The time delay defined in LEADSTO is taken as a
uniform time step Dt here. Table 3 below summarises the
formalisation of LP both in LEADSTO format and in dif-
ferential equation format. This is used as the formalisation
of the computational form of the cognitive model de-
scribed. During the processing, each state property has a
strength represented by a real number between 0 and 1
Table 2 Overview of the connections and their weights
from states to state weights LP
EA(ai) WS(sk) ω1 LP1
EO(ai, bi, ck, sk) WS(ck) ω2 LP2 
EA(ai), EO(ai, bi, ck, sk) WS(bi) ω3, ω4 LP3 
WS(sk) SS(sk) ω5 LP4 
WS(ck) SS(ck) ω6 LP5 
WS(bi) SS(bi) ω7 LP6 
SS(sk) SR(sk) ω8 LP7 
SS(ck) SR(ck) ω9 LP8 
PA(ai), SS(bi), PO(ai,
bi, ck, sk), EO(ai, bi, ck,
sk)




bi, ck, sk), PA(aj) (j≠i)
PA(ai) ω14, ω15, ω16,
ω17
LP10 
SR(bi) F(bi) ω18 LP11 
SR(s), SR(c), PA(ai), 






PO(ai, bi, ck, sk), F(bi),
RAwr(ai, bi, ck, sk)
PAwr(ai, bi,
ck, sk)
ω24, ω25, ω26 LP13 
PA(ai), PO(ai, bi, ck, sk), 
PAwr(ai, bi, ck, sk)
EA(ai) ω27, ω28, ω29 LP14 







EA(ai), RO(ai, bi, ck,







RO(ai, bi, ck, sk), 
RAwr(ai, bi, ck, sk)
EO(ai, bi, ck,
sk)
ω38, ω39 LP17 
Here the red colour xk indicates negative weights
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through variables V (with subscripts) that run over these
values. In dynamic property specifications, this is added as
a last argument in the state property expressions. This
representation is considered only for the LEADSTO based
formalisation. Therefore, the unary predicate representa-
tion of each state in the Table 2 was extended to a binary
predicate representation by including the state strength Vn
[e.g. EA(ai) to EA(ai, Vn)]. Furthermore, the temporal step
in the original LEADSTO formalisation (see [57]) is used
as a uniform time step Dt in this paper. As an example let
us consider LP9 according to the LEADSTO formalisation:
LP9 sensory representation for an effect bi state
This expresses that after time duration Dt, the value for
the sensory representation SR(bi) of effect bi has changed
from V5 into
V5 þ c½f x10V1; x11V2; x12V3; x13V4ð ÞV5Dt
This means that
DSR bið Þ ¼ c½f x10V1; x11V2; x12V3; x13V4ð ÞV5Dt
or




x10:PA aið Þ; x11:SS bið Þ;
x12:PO ai; bi; ck; skð Þ; x13:EO ai; bi; ck; skð ÞÞSRðbiÞDt
This expression in difference equation format can be






x10:PA aið Þ tð Þ;x11:SS bið Þ tð Þ;x12:PO ai; bi; ck; skð Þ tð Þ;




The same formalisation but specifically for the rate of
activation change can be presented in its differential form
as found in Table 3 under LP9s row. Here, f is a function
for which different choices can be made. The function f
should be a combination function (when a given state has
only a single input the identity function f(W) = W is also
usable though it is less configurable). For the simulations,
the combination function f is based on a continuous logistic
threshold function g(r, s, X) is used as in the Eqs. (1) and
(2).






g r; s;Xð Þ ¼ 1







g r; s;Xð Þ ¼ 0; when X 0 ð2Þ
In the above equations, r is the steepness and s the
threshold; these are configuration parameters that change
the shape of the curve and its midpoint on the X-axis.
Activation of a state depends on multiple other states that
are directly attached to it; therefore incoming activation
levels from other states are combined to some aggregated
input and perform the activation according to a specifica-
tion as in LP9 above, or in an alternative differential
equation format, as in Eq. (3) [where g is the logistic
function specified in the Eqs. (1) and (2), and yi is the
activation level of state i].
dyi
dt








Parameter c is an update speed factor, indicating the
speed by which an activation level is updated upon re-
ceived input from other states. In this model two speed
factor values are used: one for the internal states (states
which are inside the dotted box in Fig. 1), and the other for
the external states: WS(sk), WS(ck), WS(bi), SS(sk), SS(ck),
SS(bi), EA(ai) and EO(ai, bi, ck, sk). The internal states’
speed factor is higher than the external states (adhering to
the phenomenon that brain neurons are activating much
faster than sensor and effector organs).
To obtain a computational specification for temporal
simulation of each state, a difference equation is used in the
form of Eq. (4).
yi t þ Dtð Þ ¼ yi tð Þ þ ci g r; s;
X











By having different values for each parameter (i.e. for
weight values xi, time step size Dt, slow and fast speed
factors c, steepness ri, threshold si), the agent can facilitate
a wide variety of behaviours. Each LP in Table 3 is rep-
resented in a computational form (by the JAVA language)
and the dynamics of the system is achieved through
evaluating the causality effects through a set of difference
equations as in Eq. (4). For each discrete time step Dt the
If the preparation state for action ai has level V1
and the sensor state for effect bi has level V2
and the prior self-ownership of action ai for bi, ck, and sk has 
level V3
and the communication of ownership and awareness of ai
for bi, ck, and sk has level V4
then after time duration Δt the state sensory representation 
for an effect bi will have the level:
V5 + γ [ f( ω10V1, ω11V2, ω12V3, ω13V4) – V5 ] Δt
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Table 3 Specification of local properties in the hybrid language LEADSTO and in differential equation format
Here Y(i,k) means (ai, bi, ck, sk) and for each LP, the first representation is in the LEADSTO and that will be followed by the differential equation
format
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behaviour of each state is calculated the emergence of the
behaviour is traced with a identified parameter value set.
From a mathematical point of view, the dynamics of the
model is (numerically) solving the differential equations of
LP1 to LP17 by assuming that at time t = 0, WS(s) and
WS(c) holds value 1 as state level.
Some of these behaviours are presented as simulations
in Sect. 4.
4 Simulation results
In this section, simulation experiments for a number of
example scenarios are discussed, which all involve the
occurrence of a preparation state for an action ai, triggered
by some stimulus sk and context ck. These scenarios relate
to phenomena in the literature, as discussed in Sects. 1 and
2. They have been generated based on the specification
presented in Sect. 3. Eight scenarios have been simulated
to highlight the different possible behaviours of the model
and among those three scenarios are new, whereas the other
five were selected from the previous work in [22] but those
behaviours have been significantly improved in the newer
versions presented here. Furthermore, for the scope of this
paper only c is ‘self’ situations are selected (for some ex-
amples where c is ‘other’ see [22, 23]). The following is a
summary of the different simulated scenarios:
(1) The first scenario simulated describes a situation
where the prepared action has satisfactory predicted
effects and therefore is executed; in this case both
prior and retrospective awareness states occur. This
scenario will be considered as the base case for the
interplay between conscious and unconscious
processes.
(2) The second scenario simulated describes a situation
where the prepared action has satisfactory predicted
effects and therefore is executed but the awareness is
absent (in other words merely an unconsciousness
action). The strength of the action execution is lower
as compared to the first scenario.
(3) The third scenario simulated describes a situation
where the prepared action lacks satisfactory predict-
ed effects, and is therefore not executed: a no–go
decision, or vetoing in unconscious form. Further-
more, the awareness state is almost absent due to the
almost absent feeling.
(4) The fourth scenario simulated describes a situation
where a poor action prediction capability is mod-
elled: the action effect is falsely predicted as
satisfactory. This leads to a prior ownership state,
which is sufficient to actually execute the prepared
action. In this case, a low retrospective ownership
state and almost absent retrospective awareness state
will occur, as the sensory representation of the effect
stays low. This simulation is used to explain the
basic cognition and behaviour of a schizophrenic
patient.
(5) The fifth scenario simulated describes a situation
where two prepared actions exist for two input
stimuli (s1, s2, c1 and c2) but one is relatively less
positive compared to the other on predicted effects
(difference is 0.2 in terms of the weight x10). The
one which is less positive (2nd option) gets diluted
over time in terms of PA(a2), SR(b2), F(b2), PO(a2,
b2, c2, s2) and PAwr(a2, b2, c2, s2) while the other
prepared action gets executed and develops the
retrospective awareness too.
(6) The sixth scenario simulated describes a situation
exactly as in the fifth scenario but in this case once
the action with the strongest predictive effect [i.e.
SR(b1)] is executed it does not suppress the inputs s2
and c2. Therefore, once EA(a1) is executed because
of the existence of s2 and c2 the agent is preparing
for EA(a2) and successfully this will be performed.
This confirms the agent capacity of cognitive control
combining both conscious and unconscious
processes.
(7) The seventh scenario simulated describes a situation
where the agent is prepared for an action by
expecting a particular effect b1, though it is actual
effect after execution is different: b2 (mismatch
between the predicted and actual). As claimed by
Haggard, this scenario contributes to the idea that
awareness of an action is a dynamic combination of
both predictive and inferential sense-making. Having
a strong predicted effect agent develops a strong
prior awareness, but not sensing the same effect it
leads to a poor retrospective awareness of that
predicted effect. This phenomenon is important for
the agent’s learning process through error correction.
(8) The eighth scenario simulated describes a situation
that can be considered as an early stage of a
cognitive impairment for depressive symptoms. In
this case, the agent is preparing for two action
options where one is having a positive feeling while
the other is with a negative feeling [i.e. F(b1) and
F(b2)]. According to the biased nature on negative
feelings, the agent consciously affects selection of
the negative one, though both options are identical
from an action selection perspective (i.e. by having
exactly the same values for all the parameters for
each option except for x29). Due to this conscious
biased influence agent will execute the action with a
negative feeling and it is considered to be that
repeatedly performing these type of thoughts/tasks it
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will develop a negative mood that leads to a
depression situation (in a long run).
Although these simulations will be presented in more
abstract manner without relating them to real examples all
the time, in general from a real-world perspective, the
following example explanation of a scenario can be kept in
mind:
• Stimulus s is that you need to withdraw some money.
• Context c is that you are in a bank and in front of an
ATM.
• Action a is clicking on specific buttons to withdraw €
55.
• Effect b of action a is that you get € 55 cash.
This simple happy example scenario may have many
variations such as:
• the person may doubt whether to directly withdraw € 55
or to first check the current balance in the account
• once the person has entered € 55 to withdraw, the
system may inform the person that it does not have € 5
notes and ask to change the amount
• may be surprisingly ATM will return the card but
without the money
Furthermore, when considering complex systems like
Air Traffic Management there will be many examples that
this model can be utilised (see [58] for more examples).
4.1 Selecting values for parameters of the model
Selecting parameter values for a dynamic cognitive model
which consists with set of differential equations is a non-
trivial research challenge. This will be even more difficult
when there are no detailed numerical empirical data to use in
this process, but only some characteristics of behaviours
available inmore fuzzy form (cf. [59]). Furthermore, another
problem with computational cognitive models is that for
different types of persons with different behaviours it may
seem necessary to find a unique person-dependent set of
parameters from scratch. As an alternative, if it is possible to
identify a particular parameter value set which is able to
demonstrate a variety of situations using only veryminimum
number of variations this would make the issue easier to
handle. Therefore, in this work the focus has been on finding
such a generic parameter value set that provides more con-
fidence from the model validation perspective and its prac-
tical usage in future complex applications. The current
model consists of many parameters: 39 weight values (for
one option: k = i = 1):xi, a time step size:Dt, slow and fast
speed factors: c, 17 steepness: ri, and 17 threshold: si.
Table 4 presents connection weight values and Table 5
presents threshold (s) and steepness (r) values used in con-
figurations of simulations on this cognitive model. From
these it is clear that the weight value set is generic and just
changing very fewweights (inmost of the cases either one or
two) have obtained the different expected behaviours.
The main challenge in this approach is that there is no
real detailed data value set that can be compared to the
output of the agent model to estimate parameters. Only
certain features of the behaviour of each cognitive state are
known for different scenarios, based on neurological and
behavioural evidence from the literature (for example prior
awareness should occur before the action execution and
after prior ownership, there should be a dip in the sensory
representation in-between predictive representation and
inferential representation, et cetera). To identify the pa-
rameter values a systematic approach is used. For this
approach, it is a necessary condition to select multiple
scenarios (minimum is three but having more will improve
the quality of the results) which are interrelated from a
functional point of view. For example, the first scenario is
considered to be as a reference scenario and the second
scenario is different from that just by achieving that
awareness states are not developing (i.e. x24 = x25 =
x34 = x35 = x36 = 0). Furthermore, the third scenario
handles a case in which a prepared action lacks satisfactory
predictive effects (i.e. x24 = 0.2), and the fourth scenario
addresses poor action prediction capability (i.e.
x18 = 0.2); and so on (see Table 4). This interrelation
among scenarios is very important for a minimum number
of parameter changes enabling to identify a generic pa-
rameter value set for the model.
In this parameter estimation approach the idea is as follows:
• First scenario is addressed and parameter values are
calibrated to simulate its behaviour as identified
through the literature.
• Then using the obtained parameter value set, by changing
just a few (scenario-related) weight values it is checked
whether themodelwith these parameter settings is able to
generate the behaviour for the second scenario.
• If this provides a simulation with a pattern as expected
(without changes to the previously obtained parameter
values, except for the changes particular to the current
scenario) then it provides a good confidence on the
current identified parameter value set,
• But if not, then it is necessary to change the parameter
values of the first simulation (based on the sensitivity of
certain parameters on the required final output) until the
behaviours for both simulations are satisfactory.
• This approach is incrementally extended to each
scenario until a generic parameter value set for all the
scenarios has been identified. For any new scenario if
any changes to the previously obtained parameter
values are required, then all previously addressed
scenarios are readdressed.
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• In the first few iterations, it may challenging to identify
a parameter value set, but over time the convergence is
really fast and it will be experienced that the identified
parameter value set is more generic and it is facilitating
the necessary behaviours for simulations even without
any changes to the obtained parameter value set.
In addition to the parameter values in Tables 4 and 5 for
the step size (Dt), slow speed factor (c), and fast speed
factor (c) parameter values 0.25, 0.6 and 0.7 were used
respectively for all the scenarios.
4.2 Scenario 1: normal execution with ownership
and awareness
The first scenario considered describes a situation where
the context c is the agent itself, and a stimulus s occurs.
The action effect b of a is considered positive for the agent
and the awareness of action formation and execution will
occur, together with generated prior and retrospective
ownership states. The following execution trace will be
expected from the agent here:
– External stimulus s and context c will occur and trigger
preparation of action a.
– Based on the preparation state for a, the sensory
representation of the (positive) predicted effect b of a is
generated.
– Based on this positive predicted effect and the
other states, a prior ownership state for action a is
generated.
– Prior ownership for action a is followed by the prior
awareness; this is generated just before the action
execution.
Table 4 Connection weight values used for cognitive agent model
Weights Scen. 1 Scen. 2 Scen. 3 Scen. 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8
Stim. 1 Stim. 2 Stim. 1 Stim. 2 Effect1 Effect2 Stim. 1 Stim. 2
ω1 0.5 * * – * *
ω2 0.8 * * * – * *
ω3 0.7 0.0 0.5
ω4 0.7 0.0 * *
ω5– ω6 1.0 –
ω7 0.8 0.5
ω8– ω9 1.0 –




ω14– ω15 0.8 –
ω16 0.7 –
ω17 0.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 – 0.1 0.1
ω18 0.8 0.2
ω19 0.3 –
ω20– ω22 0.8 –
ω23 0.8 –
ω24 0.9 0.0 –
ω25 0.8 0.0 –
ω26 0.8 –
ω27– ω28 0.8 –










In here if a value of a particular weight is empty for a scenario that means it is equal to the value of that in the Scenario 1. Furthermore if a value
is ‘–’ then such a link was not existed for that scenario and furthermore ‘*’ presents that the particular link suppresses both its mapping inputs and
all the remaining
90 D. J. Thilakarathne, J. Treur
123
– The prior ownership and prior awareness states for
action a lead to actual execution of action a.
– The execution of a affects b in a positive manner and
propagates to the sensory representation of b and the
feeling of b.
– At the same time the sensory representation of b is
suppressed due to the prior self ownership state.
– Based on the generated states, after the execution of
action a the agent develops a retrospective ownership
state.
– Retrospective ownership of sensed effect b of action
a is followed by retrospective awareness of action
a and its effect
– Finally, the agent communicates this ownership and
awareness of it.
The simulation result of this scenario is shown in
Fig. 2. In this figure, it is shown that (after sensing the
stimulus) the agent triggers preparation of action a from
time point 3 on (with a peak value of 0.74 around time
point 55). Based on that the sensory representation of the
predicted effect b of a is generated (through the as-if
body loop with peak value 0.15 around time point 15 and
through the body loop with peak value 0.59 after action
execution around time point 50). This is followed by the
feeling of b (through the as-if body loop with the peak
value 0.19 and through the body loop with the peak value
0.62). These states contribute to the generation of a prior
ownership state which starts to trigger at time point 5 and
reaches a peak value of 0.77 around time point 57. After
activating prior ownership, prior awareness is developing,
mainly upon the formation process of effect prediction
b of a, and its associated feeling. The prior awareness has
started to pop up around time point 13 and has obtained
peak value 0.71 around time point 45. As a result of the
prior ownership and awareness states, the agent initiates
the actual execution of action a which propagates its ef-
fects through the (external) body loop. This clearly shows
that prior awareness is just before the action execution
(cf. [4, 5, 8]) as the action execution process started at
time point 15, and has its peak around time point 55, with
maximum strength 0.92. Furthermore, it shows that via
the body loop and the sensor state, the execution of action
a also affects the sensory representation of b and the
feeling of b. Therefore, the sensory representation b of
a behaves as expected, by adding the sensed actual effect
to the predicted effect, and the same effect is propagated
to the feeling of b too (cf. [20, 47, 48]). Due to the action
execution, the agent develops a retrospective ownership
state (starts at time point 26 with peak value 0.82 around
time point 58), which is followed by a retrospective
awareness state (starts at time point 29 with peak value
0.78 around time point 62). Finally, the agent communi-
cates ownership and awareness of it for the performed
action, based on the retrospective awareness and owner-
ship states (with the maximum strength of 0.82 around
time point 67). Note that when the stimulus is taken away
(as explained in Sect. 3 this has been performed through
an external suppressive mechanism through the orange
colour arrows in Fig. 1), all activation levels will come
down to 0; they will come up again when a new stimulus
occurs. Note that the numerical information related to the
time scale or the peak values has not been coupled with
actual brain signals but is only used as a frame of
reference.
4.3 Scenario 2: normal execution with ownership
but without awareness
There are many situations in which human action forma-
tion occurs merely unconsciously, especially when related
to habitual tasks [40]. As in the first scenario above also in
this case, the agent will experience that the prepared action
has satisfactory predicted effects. Nevertheless, the agent
will not develop any awareness state of the experienced
feeling. The following execution trace will be expected
from the agent for this scenario.
– External stimulus s and context c will occur and trigger
preparation of action a.
– Based on the preparation state for a, the sensory
representation of a (positive) predicted effect b of a is
generated.
– Based on this positive predicted effect and the other
states a prior ownership state for action a is generated,
but no prior awareness
Table 5 Threshold (s) and Steepness (r) values used in configurations of simulations
WS(sk) WS(ck) WS(bi) SS(sk) SS(ck) SS(bi) SR(sk) SR(ck) SR(bi)
r 1.00 1.00 6.00 2.00 2.00 3.50 2.00 2.00 3.00
s 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
PA(ai) F(bi) PO(Y(i,k)) PAwr(Y(i,k)) EA(ai) RO(Y(i,k)) RAwr(Y(i,k)) EO(Y(i,k))
r 2.00 3.50 6.00 5.00 6.00 5.00 4.00 5.00
s 0.50 0.01 1.00 0.60 1.00 1.90 1.60 0.80
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– The prior ownership state for action a leads to actual
execution of action a.
– The execution of a affects (via sensing) the sensory
representation of b and the feeling of b in a positive
manner
– At the same time, the sensory representation of b is
suppressed due to the prior ownership state.
– Based on the generated states, after the execution of
action a, the agent develops a retrospective ownership
state, but no retrospective awareness.
– The agent does not communicate this ownership.
The simulation result for this process is presented in
Fig. 3. The agent starts to prepare for action a at time point
2, and for this preparation a peak value of 0.52 is obtained.
Together with the action preparation, agent develops the
sensory representation of predicted effect b of a (with peak
value 0.15 based on the as-if body loop, and peak value
0.61 through the body loop) and the associated feeling of
b (with peak value 0.68). Based on this predictive infor-
mation, the agent develops prior ownership from time point
6 on and with peak value 0.7. More importantly, in this
simulation prior awareness has not developed. The devel-
oped states lead to performing the action a which starts at
the time point 14 and obtains peak value 0.43. The
execution positively affects (via the sensor state) the sen-
sory representation of b and the feeling of b (adding the
sensed actual effect to the predicted effect). With this ac-
tion execution effect, the agent develops retrospective
ownership with peak value 0.44. Finally, the agent does not
communicate the ownership about the performed action
(has a very low strength due to lack of awareness).
This cognitive behaviour trace is in line with the expec-
tations, and mainly when comparing it to Scenario 1, it
demonstrates the possible impact of the awareness states. For
example,when a prior awareness state occurs, it facilitates an
enhancing effect on action preparation, sensory representa-
tion and feeling and also provides much smoother effects (as
seen in Fig. 2). Nevertheless, in this Scenario 2, these states
have lower activation levels (also the action preparation
state), that may be attributed to the absence of enhancing
effects through prior awareness.Also this scenario highlights
the strength of action execution with awareness: the action
has executedwith a relatively high peak value (0.92 vs. 0.43).
Thismight be explained as an influence fromprior awareness
to action execution. Nevertheless, according to the literature,
further research is required to conclude this; cf. [5]. From the
computational perspective, this at least confirms the model’s
capability of action formation both with awareness and
without awareness.
4.4 Scenario 3: prepared action lacks satisfactory
predicted effects
Humans are not always responsive to all the environmental
stimuli (even in unconscious form). Nevertheless, there
should be an explanation from the perspective of internal
Fig. 2 Scenario 1: Executing an action with ownership and awareness. In here ‘Y_1’ represents ‘a1, b1, c1, s1’
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processes when receiving a stimulus why that stimulus
does not lead to an actual action execution. This simulation
provides the behaviour for such situation and explains how
the lack of (positive) predicted effects generated through
the as-if body loop relates to this. The following execution
trace will be expected for this scenario:
– External stimulus s and context c occur and trigger
preparation of action a.
– Based on the preparation state for a, only a weak
sensory representation of predicted effect b of a is
generated.
– Poor predictive effects will be reflected through the
feeling state with very low activation.
– Based on this poor predicted effect b and the other states,
a low prior ownership state for action a is generated.
– Due to the poor prior ownership and low predictive
feeling states, the agent does not develop adequate prior
awareness.
– The low prior ownership state for a does not lead to
actual execution of action a; the action a can be
considered vetoed
– The agent develops no retrospective ownership state for
a and no retrospective awareness.
– The agent does not communicate ownership or
awareness.
The simulation of this scenario is shown in Fig. 4. The
predicted effect is very low compared to the Scenario 1. This
clearly shows that the action a triggered by stimulus s (which
has an effect b) is not positive for the agent (in other words it is
more like neutral to the agent in terms of the feeling): it leads to
not getting any feelings out of it. Nevertheless, the prediction
capabilities are assumed correct in this case, so no high level of
b is correctly predicted for a. As a result of this low prediction,
the prior ownership state also stays at a very low level. Due to
this, prior awareness is not developed (stays in a very low
level), which would be needed to strengthen the action
execution. Therefore execution of the action also stays very
low (below 0.1) and due to that, there is no retrospective
ownership state, nor communication of ownership. Having a
single weight value change [x10: PA(ai) to SR(bi) from 0.8 to
0.2] to obtain this behaviour from the reference Scenario 1
shows the coherent nature of action formation and higher order
coupling as a process. This shows, from a complex systems
simulation perspective, how the same agent model by limited
variations in assigned parameter values demonstrates qualita-
tively different results. Furthermore, this confirms that the
model has adequately adapted Damasio’s hypothesis: in the
agent’s decision-making process, it has to assess the incentive
value of the choices through an internal simulation process.
4.5 Scenario 4: poor feelings of action prediction
effects of a schizophrenic patient
In the previous scenario, it was presented how the lack of
satisfactory predicted effects will lead to a No–Go decision
Fig. 3 Scenario 2: Executing an action with ownership and no awareness. In here ‘Y_1’ represents ‘a1, b1, c1, s1’
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on action execution. In the current simulation scenario, the
focus is on poor feelings of predicted effects (the satisfaction
level of the predicted effect is high but it does not adequately
feel to the agent). In this situation the action effect b for
action a, in principle is positive for the agent, like in the first
scenario. Nevertheless, the agent will not properly feel the
effects of prediction. This is what assumed to happen in (at
least some) patients with Schizophrenia [38, 47, 48]. Much
evidence exists that relates this to poor emotional aspects in
expression, experience and perception (mainly due to ab-
normalities in the workings of Amygdala) [60, 61]. Schizo-
phrenic patients often have the impression that their own
actions are being created, not by themselves, but by someone
from the outside [38]. The following execution trace will be
expected for such a phenomenon:
– External stimulus s and context c occur and trigger
preparation of action a.
– Based on the preparation state for a the sensory
representation of predicted effect b of a is generated.
– Lack of feeling of predicted effects will be
experienced.
– Based on this predicted effects and its poor feeling, a
relatively low level of a prior ownership state for action
a is generated.
– Based on this low level of prior ownership and poor
feelings, a relatively low level of prior awareness will
be developed.
– This prior ownership and awareness levels for action
a are still sufficient to lead to actual execution of action
a.
– The execution of a affects b in a positive manner and
(via sensing) the sensory representation of b but still the
felt feelings are weaker.
– Due to poor feelings, agent will not develop adequate
level of retrospective ownership and retrospective
awareness.
– The agent does not communicate ownership or aware-
ness for action a.
The simulation of this scenario is shown in Fig. 5. In
this case, the agent has not fully felt the predicted effects of
action a. After sensing, the stimulus agent has triggered
preparation of action a at time point 3 (with a peak value of
0.52). Based on that the sensory representation of predicted
effect b of a is generated (through the as-if body loop with
peak value 0.25 and through the body loop with peak value
0.59) and followed by the feeling of b (through the as-if
body loop with peak value 0.08 and through the body loop
with peak value 0.25). This clearly shows that the predicted
effect has not been properly felt by the agent due to very
low values for feeling state F(bi). Next these states con-
tribute to generate a prior ownership which starts to trigger
at the time point 6 with peak value 0.52. Together with the
prior ownership, the agent has experienced prior awareness
with peak value 0.47 (this strength is relatively less
Fig. 4 Scenario 3: Prepared action lacks satisfactory predicted effects. In here ‘Y_1’ represents ‘a1, b1, c1, s1’
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compared to the same in the first scenario: 0.71). The prior
ownership and awareness levels are much better in this
case compared to the situation in the third scenario.
Therefore, in contrast to the third scenario, these levels turn
out high enough for the execution of the action. The
maximum strength of the actual execution of action a is
0.57 and this execution has positive effects which are
sensed. Therefore, the sensory representation b of a be-
haves as expected after adding the sensed actual effect to
the predicted effect. Nevertheless, the agent has again not
properly felt the effects: it has not developed a sufficient
strength for the feeling state. Due to these poor perceived
effects of feeling, the agent has not developed an adequate
level of retrospective ownership and no retrospective
awareness. This behaviour can be interpreted as having
some strength for the prior ownership and awareness for
the action but no retrospective values for it. The agent may
reach an internal conflict situation where the action seems
not being created by itself, but by someone else. From the
parameter values’ perspective, this result has been achieved
only with a single change from the first scenario on x18
[from SR(bi) to F(bi)] from 0.8 to 0.2. Nevertheless, the
cognitive impairment behind a schizophrenic patient is
more complicated than modelled here; for example, the
impact of some other states (perception, attention, emo-
tions, etc.) has to be considered as well. Therefore, it is
required to extend the current model to provide more
realistic cognitive behaviour for Schizophrenia. Neverthe-
less, the current behaviour already demonstrates some of
the the basics.
4.6 Scenario 5: cognitive controlling when multiple
action options compete
The fifth simulation scenario explains a situation when two
action options exist (for the simulation two input stimuli
were considered for this) and both have the potential to
execute an action. The competition among the two options
and the cognitive control through unconscious and con-
scious processes on this action selection is captured, re-
sulting in execution of only one of the actions. For this
behaviour two independent input tuples (sk, ck) were used,
occurring in parallel (nevertheless it is possible to use a
single input that triggers two action options, but due to the
requirements in the next scenario the mentioned approach
was used). For each option, the same configurations were
used as in the first scenario, except for few weights (see
Table 4). In this scenario, for the connection strength re-
lated with option 2 (i.e. k = i = 2) from the action
preparation a2 to its predicted effect b2 a moderately low
value has been selected: x10 = 0.6. Values for the other
parameters were again the same as in Scenario 1 (cf.
Table 4). More importantly, if in this situation at a given
time only one input tuple occurs (either s1, c1 or s2, c2) then
Fig. 5 Scenario 4: Poor feelings of action prediction effects of a schizophrenic patient. In here ‘Y_1’ represents ‘a1, b1, c1, s1’
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each action will execute according to the same behaviour
as in the first scenario. The simulation of this scenario is
shown in Fig. 6. The following execution trace is expected
from the agent in this case:
– External stimuli s1, s2 and contexts c1, c2 will occur and
trigger preparation of actions a1 and a2 separately.
– Based on the preparation state for a1 and a2, the sensory
representations of predicted effect b1 of a1 and b2 of a2
are also generated.
– Nevertheless, the agent will show strong effects on
option a1 and the rate of activation for preparation of a2
will quickly slow down and disappear subsequently,
due to suppression by the preparation for the other
option.
– Based on this positive predicted effect and the other
states for a1, a prior ownership state for action a1 is
generated.
– Prior ownership for action a1 is followed by the prior
awareness, generated just before the action execution.
– The agent will develop neither prior ownership nor
awareness for option a2.
– Prior ownership and prior awareness states for action a1
lead to actual execution of action a1.
– The execution of a1 affects b1 in a positive manner and,
via sensing, the sensory representation of b1 and the
feeling of b1.
– At the same time the sensory representation of b1 is
suppressed due to the prior self ownership state of it.
– Based on the generated states, after the execution of
action a1 the agent develops a retrospective ownership
state for action a1.
– Retrospective ownership of action a1 is followed by
retrospective awareness of action a1.
– Finally, the agent communicates this ownership and
awareness related with option a1.
The behaviour captured in the Fig. 6 is in line with the
expected trace. Both action preparations [i.e. PA(a1) and
PA(a2)] are activated at time point 2 and, more impor-
tantly, with the same rate of activation strength until time
point 15 (this highlights the non-biased effects in early
action formation). Nevertheless, after time point 15, it is
clear that option a1 has maintained somewhat the same rate
of activation for action preparation, while for option a2 the
preparation activation strength has started to decrease, due
to suppression by the preparation for option a1, via the
suppressive link with strength x17. In parallel to action
preparation, the sensory representations and feelings for
each option are also activated, but due to the assigned
slightly lower value for weight link x10 on option 2 the
sensory representations and feelings for predicted effect of
option 2 are not maintained, in addition to the effect
through the suppressive link x17 On the preparation state
Fig. 6 Scenario 5: Cognitive controlling when multiple action options compete. In here ‘Y_1’ represents ‘a1, b1, c1, s1’ whereas ‘Y_2’
represents ‘a2, b2, c2, s2’
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for a2. Each option for action preparation independently
suppresses its complements’, proportional to the current
strength of each preparation (as in [51] for lateral inhibi-
tion). As x10 for option 2 is slightly weaker, this con-
tributes to the relatively a low value of PA(a2) in
comparison with PA(a1). Therefore, through these uncon-
scious mechanisms, the activation level of preparation state
PA(a2) becomes lower. Due to this bias in the action for-
mation process, none of the other states related to the op-
tion 2 are activated. In contrast, for option 1 all the
remaining states are activated in the same order as in the
first scenario. More importantly, not having strong dips for
sensory representation and feeling states as in the second
scenario, this further highlights the conscious influence for
action formation when compared to the aspects highlighted
for the second scenario. The agent has developed both prior
and retrospective awareness states with acceptable strength
and finally has communicated the ownership and awareness
specific to option 1.
As presented in the third section, this model includes
some suppressive external links for the purpose of the
scenario; for this scenario, once the action related to option
1 was executed it has suppressed all of the inputs, even
those related to option 2 (i.e. s2, c2) and therefore all the
states values become zero at the end of the simulation.
4.7 Scenario 6: cognitive control when multiple action
options compete: an extension of the fifth scenario
In the fifth scenario once the action a1 related to option 1
was executed, it has suppressed (or stopped) the input
stimuli related with both the options (i.e. s1, c1, s2 and c2).
In the current scenario, the same identical setup was used
but execution of action a1 does not stop the input stimuli
related with the second option. As the action option 2 has
been suppressed by action option 1, once the effects of
action option 1 have been realised, and due to that its
triggers have disappeared, execution of action option 2 can
get a second chance in the action formation process. The
following execution trace will be expected from the agent
in this case:
– External stimuli s1, s2 and contexts c1, c2 will occur in
parallel and trigger preparation of actions a1 and a2.
– Based on the preparation states for a1 and a2, the
sensory representations of predicted effect b1 of a1 and
b2 of a2 are generated.
– Nevertheless, the agent will show stronger effects on
option a1 and the rate of activation for a2 will quickly
slow down and disappear subsequently.
– Based on the positive predicted effect and the other
states for a1 a prior ownership state for action a1 is
generated.
– Prior ownership for action a1 is followed by prior
awareness; this is generated just before the action
execution.
– The agent develops neither prior ownership nor
awareness for option a2.
– Prior ownership and prior awareness states for action a1
lead to actual execution of action a1.
– The execution of a1 affects b1 in a positive manner and,
via sensing the sensory representation of b1 and the
feeling of b1.
– At the same time, the sensory representation of b1 is
suppressed due to the prior self ownership state of it.
– Based on the generated states, after the execution of
action a1, the agent develops a retrospective ownership
state for action a1.
– Retrospective ownership for action a1 is followed by
retrospective awareness of action a1.
– Finally the agent communicates this ownership and
awareness related with option a1.
– With the execution of action a1, the agent suppresses
the inputs s1 and c1.
– Due to the absence of inputs s1 and c1, preparation for
action a1 is not triggered anymore.
– The still existing inputs s2 and c2 still trigger prepa-
ration of action a2. This is not suppressed by prepara-
tion of action a1, since this is not activated anymore.
– Based on the preparation state for a2 the sensory
representation of predicted effect b2 of a2 is generated.
– Based on this positive predicted effect and the other
states a prior ownership state for action a2 is generated.
– Prior ownership for action a2 is followed by prior
awareness for action a2, which is generated just before
the execution of action a2.
– Prior ownership and prior awareness states for action a2
lead to actual execution of action a2.
– The execution of a2 affects b2 in a positive manner and,
via sensing the sensory representation of b2 and the
feeling of b2.
– At the same time, the sensory representation of b2 is
suppressed due to the prior self ownership state.
– Based on the generated states, after the execution of
action a2 the agent develops a retrospective ownership
state for action a2.
– Retrospective ownership of action a2 is followed by
retrospective awareness of action a2.
– Finally the agent communicates this new ownership
and awareness too.
The simulation of this scenario is shown in Fig. 7. In this
figure, from time point 0 to (roughly) 80 the behaviour is
exactly the same as in the fifth scenario, but around time
point 80 due to the suppressive effect on inputs s1 and c1 the
agent shows the effects of losing the suppression of action
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option a2. Therefore, the agent has again strengthens the
preparation of action a2 and subsequently the sensory rep-
resentation of predicted effect b2 of a2, and the feeling of b2.
Prior ownership co-occurs with the above states (mainly due
to its pre obtained activation strength). Followed by the prior
ownership state, the prior awareness state develops as ex-
pected. As a result of the prior ownership and awareness
states, the agent initiates the actual execution of action a2,
which propagates its effects through the external body loop.
This shows a possibility to get action a2 executed, in contrast
to Scenario 6 above where due to the action competition it is
suppressed. The peak value obtained for the action execution
is 0.88 (the same for option a1 is 0.89); this clearly shows that
both options have the same power in getting executed. The
execution of action a2 (via the body loop) has further effects
too. Due to the action execution, the agent develops the
retrospective ownership state for action a2,which is followed
by a retrospective awareness state. Finally, the agent com-
municates ownership and awareness about the just per-
formed action. This simulation shows the ability of action
selection through competition mainly from an unconscious
perspective. Having a slightly different weight value forx10
[from PAwr(ai, bi, ck, sk) to PA(ai)] on action option 2, the
same process can be simulated to demonstrate the effects of
conscious cognitive control as a top–down effect. Further-
more, it is also possible to combine both of these effects in a
simulation.
4.8 Scenario 7: mismatch between the predicted
and actual effects of an action
In most of the previous scenarios, the predicted effect al-
ways has positively affected action execution. Neverthe-
less, it may not always be the case and as pointed out in
Sect. 1 (with the example of learning how to ride a bicycle)
there may be a difference between what is predicted and
what actually occurs. In this scenario, this phenomena will
be simulated. For this simulation, a single input is con-
sidered but which triggers preparation of an action a1 for
which two options for an effect are considered: the first is
b1 which is the predicted effect of a1, whereas the second
b2 is not predicted. The second option indicates what ac-
tually will occur after execution of a1 (see Table 4). In
Table 4, the weight changes for this case have been high-
lighted for each effect option separately. For the effect
option 1 weight x3 [i.e. from EA(a1) to WS(b1)] was set ‘0’
as the effect of actual execution is not b1 and the same
weight for effect option 2 was set ‘0.5’ to facilitate the
different non-predicted effect of the action (the same ex-
planation for x4). The weight from WS(b2) to SS(b2) (i.e.
x7 for option 2) was set 0.5 to facilitate the effects of actual
sensing (this value can be further increased but 0.5 was
selected merely to highlight an average effect in the
sensing). Also according to the formation of this scenario at
the beginning, the agent will only predict the effect b1 of
Fig. 7 Scenario 6: Effects of cognitive controlling when multiple action options compete but after the first action execution. In here ‘Y_1’
represents ‘a1, b1, c1, s1’
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action a1, but not b2. Therefore, the weight x10 [i.e. PA(a1)
to SR(b2)] was set ‘0’ (the same explanation applies for
weight x12). The weight x30 from EA(a1) to RO(a1, b1, c1,
s1) was set ‘0’ as there will not be any retrospective
ownership for action a1. Furthermore, the weight x32 for
effect option 2 [i.e. from PO(a1, b2, c1, s1) to RO(a1, b2, c1,
s1)] was set ‘0’ as there is no prior ownership on action
option a2. Additionally, the link from EA(a1) to RAwr(a1,
b1, c1, s1) (i.e. x34) was also set ‘0’. Also as there is no
prior awareness related with effect option b2, weight x37
[i.e. from PAwr(a1, b2, c1, s1) to RAwr(a1, b2, c1, s1)] was
also set ‘0’. The following execution trace is expected from
the agent:
– External stimulus s1 and context c1 occur and trigger
preparation of action a1.
– Based on the preparation state for a1, the sensory
representation of a (positive) predicted effect b1 of a1 is
generated.
– Based on this positive predicted effect and the other
states, a prior ownership state for action a1 is generated.
– Prior ownership for action a1 is followed by prior
awareness, which is generated just before the action
execution.
– Prior ownership and prior awareness states for action a1
lead to actual execution of action a1.
– The execution of a1 does actually not affect b1 but a
different effect b2. Therefore, through sensing the agent
will develop a sensory representation of b2 and the
feeling of b2.
– Based on the generated states, after the execution of
action a1 the agent may develop a low retrospective
ownership state for action a1 with effect b2 due to the
conflict between predicted effect and sensed actual
effect.
– Retrospective ownership of action a1 with effect b2 is
followed by retrospective awareness of action a1 with
effect b2.
– Finally the agent may not properly communicate this
ownership and awareness (depend on the context).
The simulation of this scenario is shown in Fig. 8. As
expected the agent triggers preparation of action a1 at time
point 3 (with the peak value of 0.73). Based on that the
sensory representation of predicted effect b1 of a1 is gen-
erated (through the as-if body loop with peak value 0.23),
followed by the feeling of b1 (through the as-if body loop
with the peak value 0.30). Next these states contribute to
generate a prior ownership (for a1 with effect b1) which
starts to trigger at the time point 5 with peak value 0.84.
After activating the prior ownership, prior awareness de-
velops, mainly upon the formation process of effect pre-
diction b1 for a1. The prior awareness starts to pop up
Fig. 8 Scenario 7: Mismatch between the predicted and actual effects of an action. In here ‘Y_1’ represents ‘a1, b1, c1, s1’ whereas ‘Y_2’
represents ‘a2, b2, c2, s2’
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around time point 12 and obtains peak value 0.85. As a
result of the prior awareness and ownership states, the
agent initiates the actual execution of action a1 which
propagates its actual effects through the (external) body
loop. The action execution starts at time point 13 and its
maximum strength is 0.97. In Fig. 8, it is clearly shown
that the execution of action a1 does not affect b1 via
sensing. Instead it has a different actual effect b2; through
sensing it affects the sensory representation and the feeling
of b2. Therefore, the sensory representation b1 of a1 does
not behave as expected by adding the sensed actual effect
to the predicted effect and the same effect does not pro-
pagate to the feeling of b1 (cf. [20, 47, 48]). Two activa-
tions: that do occur are of the sensory representation of b2
and feeling for b2. They emerge just at that point in time as
they were not there at the beginning. These new states
provide satisfactory activation levels but contribute for
relatively low retrospective ownership and awareness states
(mainly due to the nonexistence of influences of prior
ownership and awareness states, respectively). Subse-
quently due to these poor retrospective ownership and
awareness states, agent does not properly communicate the
action and its effect. Poor communication was noted ex-
perimentally in [62] through a card game together with a
covert exchange to facilitate the conflict between predicted
and actual outcome. Therefore, also from experimental
findings this poor communication can be justified. Fur-
thermore, in simulation scenario 1 when there is no conflict
between predicted and occurring effect, prior awareness on
sensed effect has initiated at time point 35, whereas in this
simulation it occurs around time point 50. Therefore, the
temporal gap between the action and its perceived sensory
outcome is less when the awareness is pre-existing but it is
more when the (prior) awareness is not involved, which is
observable from these simulation results; this is referred as
intentional binding [15].
This behaviour has shown the effects when there is a
conflict between what predicted versus actual. In future
work, this will be especially useful when learning should
incorporate with the model in a dynamical form. Having
this conflict between sufficiently large prior awareness and
a very low retrospective awareness can be further explored
with more neuroscientific evidences. This is useful for
adaptive behaviours especially for situation awareness-
driven applications.
4.9 Scenario 8: cognitive impairment for shifting
to a positive feelings
In real life, agents will experience both positive and
negative situations. Nevertheless, if an agent always sticks
to negative thoughts while suppressing the possible
positive thoughts, in the long run this will lead to a de-
pression. In this scenario, the agent is preparing for two
action options where one leads to a positive feeling F(b1),
while the other leads to a negative feeling F(b2). According
to the bias to negative feelings, the agent tends to select the
negative action though both options share exactly the same
weight values for all weights on each option, except for x29
which is for prior awareness (which introduces a conscious
intervention on action execution). For the weight x29 on
the first (positive) action option 0.2 was used and for the
second (negative) option 0.8. Except this change all the
other parameter values are identical and through this only
the impact from biased conscious awareness towards a
particular action is modelled. If the agent is executing the
action which is associated to negative feeling (though at the
same time a possible positive action also exists) this will
affect the agent’s mood (the mood of the agent has not been
in the scope of this model but will be a future work).
Having a negative mood all the time together with this
biased awareness towards such negative actions will take
the agent to a cognitive disorder state called depression. A
healthy agent will have the ability to shift in a relatively
short time period again to positive actions by correcting the
biased influence. Therefore, this model can be used to
simulate a depression situation also, but with further im-
provements in the model. For the biased cognitive im-
pairment on negative actions through awareness, the
following trace is expected:
– The external stimulus s1 and context c1 will occur and
trigger preparation of actions a1 and a2.
– Based on the preparation state for a1, the sensory
representation of predicted effect b1 of a1 is generated
and in the same way for a2, the sensory representation
of predicted effect b2 of a2 is generated.
– It is assumed to be that both effects positively
contribute to the action formation process while the
effect b1 has a positive associated feeling, and the
effect b2 has a negative associated feeling.
– Based on this positive predicted effect and the other
states, a prior ownership state for action a1 and a2 is
independently generated.
– Prior ownership for action a1 is followed by the prior
awareness of a1 and the prior ownership for action a2 is
followed by the prior awareness of a2.
– Nevertheless, the prior awareness of a2 will dominate
the action formation process due to the biased
competition.
– Due to this the states related to action a1 will loose their
activation, while the sates related to action a2 will
continue as the selected options.
– Prior ownership and prior awareness states for action a2
lead to actual execution of action a2.
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– The execution of a2 affects b2 in a positive manner
through the sensing.
– The agent develops sensory representation of b2 and the
feeling of b2 in line with what is predicted.
– Based on the generated states, the agent develops a
retrospective ownership state for action a2 with effect b2.
– Retrospective ownership of action a2 with sensed effect
b2 is followed by retrospective awareness of action a2
with effect b2.
– Finally the agent communicates this ownership and
awareness.
The simulation of this scenario is shown in Fig. 9; it is
in line with the expected trace. The agent has initiated two
action preparations once the input stimuli are received.
Both PA(a1) and PA(a2) are activated at time point 3 and
almost with the same activation speed. Parallel to this the
agent also initiates the sensory representation and feelings
for effects b1 and b2 for actions a1 and a2, respectively.
Furthermore, the rates of activation for these four states are
also almost the same at the very beginning (until prior
awareness states pop up). Followed by these states, prior
ownership states are also activated for both options and
then subsequently the prior awareness states for each op-
tion. Roughly at time point 10, the prior awareness states
start to emerge and from that very moment the states re-
lated with the option 1 show decline effects. For example,
the action preparation states initially have same speed but
after the time point 10 state PA(a1) is losing the speed,
whereas PA(a2) maintains the same momentum and
reaches maximum value 0.75. Similar to this SR(b1)
reaches peak value 0.11 through the as-if body loop (i.e.
through the predictive process), whereas SR(b2) reaches
peak value 0.23 through the predictive process and 0.63
through the body loop. Furthermore, F(b1) reaches peak
value 0.14 through the as-if body loop, whereas F(b2)
reaches peak value 0.30 through the predictive process and
0.66 through the body loop. Moreover, PO(a1, b1, c1, s1)
reaches peak value 0.15, whereas PO(a2, b2, c2, s2) reaches
peak value 0.68. Also PAwr(a1, b1, c1, s1) reaches only a
0.09 value but PAwr(a2, b2, c2, s2) reaches 0.68.
These results clearly show the impact from conscious
intervention for the action formation process (all the other
unconscious related suppressive parameter values are
identical for both options and therefore no bias was intro-
duced by unconscious processes). Therefore, due to this
bias the negatively associated action option a2 has executed
with peak value 0.92. Furthermore, it is shown that the
execution of action a2 (via the body loop) also affects in
positive manner via sensing, the sensory representation of
b2 and the feeling of b2. Due to these, the agent develops
RO(a2, b2, c2, s2) at time point 30 with peak value 0.79 and
RAwr(a2, b2, c2, s2) at the time point 34 with peak value
0.76. The agent does not develop any retrospective effects
associated to action option a1. Finally, the agent has
Fig. 9 Scenario 8: Cognitive impairment for shifting to a positive feeling. In here ‘Y_1’ represents ‘a1, b1, c1, s1’ whereas ‘Y_2’ represents ‘a2,
b2, c2, s2’
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strongly communicated the ownership and awareness on
action a2.
5 Discussion and future work
Computational modelling is considered an important pillar
for the development of cognitive science and related dis-
ciplines [63–65]. Moreover, the developments in brain
imaging and recording techniques also strongly contribute
to more and more focused phenomena explored in the
cognitive, behavioural, affective and physiological re-
search areas. Nevertheless, there is room for a more
generic, compound process to explain a wide range of
cognitive functionalities by aggregating many of these lo-
cal but highly influential information from the computa-
tional perspective [66]. For example, Ron Sun in [66] has
stated that ‘‘integrative computational cognitive modelling
may serve in the future as an antidote to the increasing
specialization of scientific research’’ [66], p. 14. On the
other hand, there are many implications of these hypothe-
ses (or evidences) and it would be beneficial if there was a
mechanism that can be used to scrutinize these ideas or
hypotheses using this as a workbench in much more ab-
stract and global level (cf. [64]). Additionally, the human
brain and its phenomena are immeasurably complex sys-
tems/processes that involve many uncountable factors that
make experiments not always coherent with reality. Nev-
ertheless, having computational models enables to uplift
the progress of understanding these processes in a broader
level as a multidisciplinary approach (cf. [63]).
From the Artificial Intelligence perspective, more and
more complex systems related problems are addressed that
include human cognitive aspects. For example, situations
related to air traffic management, stock market analysis,
business processes, human awareness of energy usage,
cognitive impairments and various medical disorders, how
a certain form of therapy can have its effect on a patient,
etc. In many such situations, it is not practical to create real
experimental setups to analyse the emergence of problems.
Nevertheless, the importance and significance of such
analysis is essential from a safety, performance and health
perspective. Multi-agent-based simulation approaches have
been noted as the potential solution for this [67] by con-
sidering agent-based simulations. Such simulations can
capture emergent phenomena, providing a natural de-
scription of a system, and its flexibility: essentials for such
complex system research. Even though agent-based
simulations are a promising technology for this, there are
many problems associated with it in terms of more realistic
models for such agents to behave or perform. Often non
nature inspired, simple heuristically determined rule-driven
agent simulations are used for this, although reality is more
complicated and far away from those simplifications. It
needs more realistic representations and analysis in much
closer to the natural situation (cf. [67]). Therefore, in agent
systems more realistic computational models that make use
of the latest neuro-cognitive findings can be used to
simulate agent behaviour in a more realistic manner.
Especially when it comes to the systems that include hu-
man cognition factors in dynamic systems, nature inspired
cognitive computational models have more power to pro-
vide realistic results. Therefore, computational cognitive
modelling as a multidisciplinary approach has many ben-
efits for both cognitive science and artificial intelligence.
This paper presented a computational cognitive model
for action awareness focusing on action preparation and
performance by considering its cognitive effects and affects
from both prior and retrospective perspective relative to the
action execution. It is a fundamental research question what
is the human cognition behind the action selection and how
this is related to conscious and unconscious elements.
Mainly for two hypotheses or claims, attention has been
obtained by the community, as presented in Sects. 1 and 2.
However, it is not yet clear what is the exact process behind
this human cognition. The first hypothesis (by Benjamin
Libet and others) claimed that humans may prepare for and
perform actions without being conscious of these prepara-
tion and execution processes, and the awareness of motor
intention of this action is not causing the behaviour, but
comes after the action preparation and relatively just before
the action execution time [4–8]. The second hypothesis (by
Haggard and co-workers) claims that awareness of an action
is a dynamic combination of both prior awareness and ret-
rospective awareness through predictive motor control and
inferential sense-making relative to the action execution,
respectively [20, 21]. Furthermore, the intentional binding
effect [15] shows the impact of awareness on action selec-
tion and this contributes to the second hypothesis to bring
out the influence of awareness on action selection. Although
these two hypothesises seem to contradict each other from
the semantic point of view, by other research (cf. [5]) from a
pragmatic point of view it seems hard to generally reject any
of these claims on the basis of the available empirical evi-
dences. This paper utilizes both ideas into a compound
process (together with other supportive processes) and
scrutinizes the behaviour through related scenarios. This
work was not conducted from scratch, but adopts parts of the
model presented in [23], mainly for the mechanisms of ac-
tion ownership and other unconscious states/processes (e.g.
action preparation, sensory representation, effect prediction
process, mirroring, etc.). Having that previous model which
was validated through simulations mainly for unconscious
action formation, in this paper its scope is further extended
to incorporate the conscious aspects related to action se-
lection. The main research questions for this work are
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(1) How does the internal prediction process shape or
contribute to the (prior) awareness of the action?
(2) How does the inferential sense-making shape or
contribute to the (retrospective) awareness of the
action execution?
(3) How does the awareness contribute to action
execution?
(4) What is the relation and interplay between conscious
and unconscious action formation through action
ownership and relevant awareness states?
Each research question is explored from the cognitive
science perspective and analysed through the modelling
perspective (with simulations) to isolate a working defini-
tion. For the internal prediction process, the hypothesis of
Damasio’s as-if body loop is used as a basis, as previously
presented in [23]. In the current model, it is further ex-
tended by embedding an unconscious process referred as
the lateral inhibition (see [49]) to strengthen the competi-
tion among action options through the as-if body loop.
With that new addition the unconscious action prediction
process is coupled with the prior awareness state (as a
higher order cognitive state) to facilitate the conscious
aspects as proposed by Haggard et al.: predictive processes
are also playing a role in action awareness (e.g. see [20,
21]). Also given empirical evidence to support the idea that
awareness of motor intention for an action comes after the
action preparation and relatively just before the action
execution time (cf. [4–8]), in this model it is ensured that
the awareness states are always higher order cognitive
states which are not getting affected by most of the low
level cognitive states. Predictive processes anticipate ef-
fects of each action option and lead to a competition to get
selected a GO signal. The basic decision-making is as-
sumed to be based on a feeling-related valuations associ-
ated with the effects of each action option. These internally
predicted feelings work as a bottom–up feedback to de-
velop a coherent conscious experience of action selection,
mainly on action options that have strong predictive ef-
fects; therefore, actions with poor predictive effects do not
get any conscious attention. Therefore, prior awareness
state is only affected by the feeling and prior ownership
states. The simulation results have confirmed that when
there is a prior awareness it always appears just before the
action execution.
The same approach is applied to the second research
question, also to isolate a working definition. Once the
feedback sensory information on the effects of the actual
action execution is available and is integrated with the
predicted effects as suggested in [20, 47, 48] to evaluate the
binding of what is predicted and the actual effect. Through
this sense-making process, the agent will experience the
retrospective effects as presented in previous work [23],
mainly for acknowledging authorship of an action, reflec-
tion on one’s own functioning, personal learning and de-
velopment. This was further extended with a new abstract
cognitive state name called retrospective awareness which
is responsible for more conscious interpretation of retro-
spective effects of the action execution. Having empirical
evidences for the contribution of inferential processes on
action awareness from Haggard and co-workers’ ex-
periments (cf. [20, 21]), this extension can be justified from
the cognitive neuroscience perspective. Furthermore,
through simulations on relevant scenarios this extension
was validated. Especially the seventh scenario clearly
shows that when there is a mismatch between what is
predicted and what actually occurs, the two steps sigmoid
behaviour on the sensory representation and the feeling
states is not observed, whereas a poor retrospective
awareness on the effect was predicted, as highlighted in
[20]. When considering the first scenario and the seventh,
this may even contribute for the observation of intentional
binding (cf. [15]) mainly through the feeling state: in-
creasing the same feeling through inferential information
and forming a completely new feeling through the infer-
ential process. In the seventh simulation, the agent does not
aggregate the prior awareness to the retrospective aware-
ness and therefore the agent will not be consciously able to
communicate the conflict or mismatch. This also shows the
subjective time effect found in the intentional binding:
when there is no conflict between predicted and occurring
effect, the prior awareness on sensed effect has initiated
earlier than when a conflict occurs. Therefore, the feeling
of the temporal gap between the action and its perceived
sensory outcome can be explained through the retrospec-
tive awareness [15]. To have these results in this model, the
retrospective awareness states were mainly affected by four
states: action execution of ai, feeling of effect bi, prior
awareness for action ai with bi, ck, and sk and prior own-
ership for action ai with bi, ck and sk.
The third research question shows many thoughts within
the cognitive neuroscience community. It suggests that
awareness is not a cause for an action execution but it
seems like an after-effect of a set of unconscious cognitive
processes leading to the action [1, 4–8]. The other idea
shows that an additional influence through awareness may
inject some bias or effect on decision-making especially
with the findings of intentional binding [15, 21, 37, 43].
There are empirical evidences to support the second claim
(at least for some inputs), emphasising why it is hard to
accept the first claim due to its non moderate statistical
strength on empirical evidences: in general only *60 %
accuracy in experimental data (see [5]). Therefore, this
model includes both features: awareness is not required for
action execution and awareness may play a role in action
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execution, depending on the specific scenario. In other
words, the model handles both the purely unconscious
action formation and the hybrid form of action formation
with both conscious and unconscious elements. Further-
more, through the simulation results also this was
validated. Especially the first and second scenarios provide
information to show that the agent is able to execute an
action with and without awareness. The eighth scenario
presents a situation in which biased awareness may trans-
form a healthy person into a cognitively impaired position.
By continuing the cognition behind the eighth scenario for
a longer period of time, this can even explain the effects of
a patient suffering from a depression (this will be consid-
ered as a future work). Therefore, with different settings
and scenarios, the model is capable to demonstrate the
contribution of awareness from zero to high. Therefore, the
model facilitates a good spectrum to represent the effects of
awareness on action selection. There are situations, for
example like flight or fight situations, which mostly show
the unconscious action formation side of the spectrum that
includes very quick and strong action executions (cf. [68–
70]). According to the second scenario, it is clear that when
agent is purely performing in an unconscious mode, the
strength of action execution is relatively weak. Therefore,
it may be possible to add improvements to this model and
its settings, especially on the unconscious perspective in-
cluding the emotion related effects. Further information on
the interplay between bottom–up and top–down processes
seems to be useful for such further improvements of this
model (see [68–71]).
The fourth research question is realised as an aggrega-
tion of the other three questions. The interplay between
conscious and unconscious action formation is mainly re-
alised through having effects from feeling and ownership
states on the awareness states (unconscious to conscious),
and effects from prior awareness states to the action
preparation and action execution states (conscious to un-
conscious). The first links (bottom–up) play a role to pass
low level information to develop awareness of what is
going on in a high level form, whereas the second type of
links (top–down) contributes to inject some bias or ex-
citement to intentionally drive the action formation. When
there is poor activation of the bottom–up links, agent is
unable to develop prior awareness and therefore, as pre-
sented in the second scenario, the agent can perform the
action selection in purely unconscious form by the feeling
of ownership. When the agent is having sufficient activa-
tions in bottom–up links, awareness develops and shows
how that leads to an action execution, as in the first sce-
nario. Also particularly in the eighth scenario, the role of
top–down links demonstrates the power of an intentional
focus on action selection. The third simulation highlights
why agents are not always performing a task even in
unconscious mode. This shows that even in unconscious
form it is necessary to have a sufficiently large satisfactory
predicted effect to have a GO signal. Therefore, this shows
the mechanism of vetoing in unconscious form. The cog-
nitive control is a useful process to explain the interplay
between conscious and unconscious action formation. The
fifth and sixth simulations present the role of cognitive
control. In the fifth simulation, it shows how a particular
option is getting suppressed by the other option through
cognitive control just by having a value of 0.2 difference
for the links between action preparation to sensory repre-
sentation for two options. The sixth simulation shows that
once the dominant option of the fifth simulation completed,
the suppressed action option emerges due to not having the
effects of cognitive control and, more importantly, with
strong activations for each state. Through this, it is clear
from the simulation perspective that the model can have
different configurations to facilitate different behaviours
both from the unconscious and the combination of con-
scious and unconscious forms. Also as mentioned in the
other three research questions, the cognitive neuroscience
basis behind this model was inspired by the experiments
and evidences found in the literature.
Having interesting simulation results for many scenar-
ios, still there is more to improve on this work. It was
possible to isolate a generic parameter value set that
worked for 8 simulations. A generic parameter value set
provides more confidence from the model validation per-
spective and its practical usage in future complex appli-
cations. Nevertheless, it is not a trivial task to find such
generic parameter value set. The approach used to identify
this parameter value set was explained in Sect. 4.1, but it is
not a fully automated process. Due to the complexity of the
human brain and limitations in measuring techniques of
human cognition, there are no detailed numerical empirical
data to use in this process, but only some characteristics of
behaviours are available in more fuzzy form. Due to this
issue, it is not possible to directly use parameter estimation
techniques available for dynamic systems. Therefore, it is
useful to explore the parameter estimation techniques
particular to the characteristics of these types of work.
Furthermore, from the cognitive neuroscience perspective,
this model has many more areas to explore both in con-
scious and unconscious levels. In the third scenario, it
shows the vetoing process in unconscious form, but the
same process with awareness which is referred as inten-
tional inhibition is a future work for this model. Human
awareness has its specializations, for example, emotional
awareness, situation awareness. Working processes behind
these concepts are more complicated and need further re-
search to incorporate those into this model.
Finally, this model may be useful in many applications.
Especially for agent-based simulations on complex systems
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that need action selection related to cognitive aspects. Also,
this model can be used as a basis for subsequent work in
developing ambient agent systems able to monitor, analyse
and support persons trying to develop a healthy lifestyle. If
such systems have such a model of the underlying human
processes, they can use this to have a deeper understanding
of the human.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original
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